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1993/2 —  Éditions BRUYLANT, Bruxelles
GULF WAR COMPENSATION STANDARD : 
CONCERNS UNDER THE CHARTER
B Y
Rex J. ZEDALIS (*)
I .
In an essay on the burning of the Kuwaiti oilflelds and the doctrine of 
military necessity, which appeared two years ago in the pages of the 
Review (1), I alluded to a fascinating question regarding the United 
Nations’ authority to fïx war claims liability on Iraq simply because of that 
country’s culpability in initiating the August 1990 unlawful invasion and 
occupation of the sheikdom of Kuwait (2). The appropriateness of returning 
to that question seems demonstrated by the recent literature on the newly 
formed post-Gulf War U.N. Compensation Commission (3). Some of that 
literature makes clear that paragraph 8 of Resolution 674 (4), and para- 
graph 16 of Resolution 687 (5), the two controlling Security Council pro- 
nouncements, are interpreted by thoughtful scholars as resting liability 
solely on the illegality of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of its tiny neigh- 
bor to the southeast (6). As one commentator has put it, Iraqi « [ljiabili- 
ty ...exists even in cases where the individual act of an Iraqi agent, taken 
in isolation, would not constitute a violation of international law. » (7) 
Given that the Security Council Resolutions referenced above speak in
(*) Director, Comparative and International Law Center, and Professor of Law, University 
of Tulsa ; Cutting Fellow in International Law (1980-81) and J.S.D. (1987), Columbia University.
(1) Z e d a l i s , «Military Necessity and Iraqi Destruction of Kuwaiti Oil», 1990/2 Revue Belge 
de Droitlnternational 333.
(2) Id. at 334, note 17.
(3) See G a b m îs e , «The Iraqi Claims Process and the Ghost of Versailles », 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
840 (1992) ; Cr o o k , « The United Nations Compensation Commission — — A New Structure to 
Enforcé State Responsibility », 87 Am. J. Int’l L. 144 (1993).
(4) SC Res. 674 (Oct. 29, 1990), reprinted in 29 Irit'l L. Mat. 1561 (1990).
(5) SC Res. 687 (Spr. 3, 1991), reprinted in 30 Int’l L. Mai. 846 (1991).
(6) See Cr o o k , swpra note 3 at 147 (« the key causal factor giving rise to responsibility is the 
unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait»).
(7) Id. On Crook’s familiarity with the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal see Cr o o k , «Applicable 
Law in International Arbitration : The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Expérience», 83 Am. J. Int'l 
L. 278 (1989).
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terms of liability for loss, damage, or injury « as a result of » (8) the invasion 
and occupation, there would seem ample support for the view that the 
determining standard stresses automatic liability because of Iraq’s illégal 
aggression, not because each discrete claim involves an act or omission 
inconsistent with some spécifié principle of international law relative to 
armed combat.
Clearly, it would not be à radical departure from the historical practice 
regarding war claims to find that, siniply as a resuit of the aggressive war 
against Kuwait, Iraq has been fixed with liability for the injurious consé­
quences thereof (9). In many many cases, war claims have been settled in 
accordance with political, moral, or economic considérations alone (10). 
Occasionally, though, settlement has taken into accourit whether the claims 
have been ba,sed on individual showings of violations of précisé rules of 
international law governing the prosecution of combat, or have been affec- 
ted by the presence of legally recognized exculpatory circumstances insula- 
ting the state against which the claim is made (11). What is so intriguing 
about the Security Council Résolutions dealing with Iraq concerns the 
extent to which the UN is empowered to set to one side issues of internatio­
nal law in the actual conduct of the hostilities, and impose liability on the 
basis of nothing more than the illegality of the original invasion and occu­
pation. Much may exist in the practice of states to suggest war claims have 
been settled in accordance with such an approach in the past. But do the 
provisions of the Charter itself envision the United Nations being vested 
with authority to replicate such practice and fix liability without reference 
to the laws governing the actual behavior of armed forces following the ini­
tiation of an illégal war of aggression ?
II.
Of the more général provisions in the UN Charter bearing upon the issue 
of the Security Council’s power to fix war claims liability without regard 
to the laws and customs of warfare, points three and six of the Preamble
(8) SC Res. 674, para. 8, swpra note 4, states it « [rjeminds Iraq that under international law 
it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, ..., as a 
resuit of the invasion and illégal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. » SC Res. 687, para. 16, sv/pra 
note 5, provides the Security Council « [r]eaffirms that Iraq, ..., is liable under international law 
for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural 
resources, or injury ...as a resuit of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. »
(9) As to the scope of liability, para. 8 of SC Res. 674, id., speaks iii terms of liability for 
« any » loss, damage or injury, but para. 16 of SC Res. 687, id., confines liability to « any direct » 
loss, damage, or injury.
(10) See generally Y a t e s , « State Responsibility for Nonwealth Injuries to Aliens i in Interna­
tional Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens 211, 256 (R. Lillich éd., 1983). H a n n a , 
«Légal Liability for War Damage», 43 Mich. L. Rev. 1057 (1945).
(11) See generally W. B is h o p , International Law : Cases and Materials 797-98 (Bd. ed. 1971) 
(discussing examples where no treaty of peace was concèmed).
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are relevant. In expressing the world community’s détermination to « esta- 
blish conditions under which ...respect for the obligations ...arising 
from ...international law can be maintained, » (12) point three evidences a 
high degree of focus on the connection between international standards and 
their observance by the UN itself. This détermination is then followed by 
the point’s indication the community therefore aims at avoiding the use of 
force by « ensur[ing] ...the acceptance of principles .... » (13) Since there is 
no serious dispute about the significance of the Charter’s Preamble in 
understanding the authority possessed by the organs of the United Nations 
and the ways that authority can be exercised (14), the references in points 
three and six to «respect for ...international law» and «the acceptance of 
principles » could well operate to constrain the Security Council’s ability to 
provide for war claims compensation without regard to the rules governing 
the conduct of armed combat. If the allusion to « international law » signi­
fies a commitment by the UN to honor established international rules, then 
the drafters of the Charter may have bound the Security Council to the 
limitations that war claims be based on violations of the laws of war (15). 
Similarly, in the event the drafters’ goal in point six of «ensur[ing] ...the 
acceptance of principles > reveals a firm dedication to actions consonant 
with controlling légal norms, then the Charter may oblige the organs envi- 
sioned by it to consider, and not ignore, standards which speak in terms 
of compensation payable for acts of combat deemed reprehensible (16). One 
might view the pattern of settling claims following the two world wars this 
century as providing some support for the interprétation suggested. Indeed, 
in the opening point of the Charter’s Preamble the drafters specifïcally 
recalled the « scourge of war which twice in [their] lifetime ...brought untold 
sorrow ... » to the community of nations (17). To be sure, the settlements in
(12) See U.N. Charter, Preamble, point three, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, reading :
We The Peoplea Of The United Nations Determined
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from trea- 
ties and other sources of international law can be maintained.
(13) Id., point six, reading :
And For These Ends
save in the common interest. ...
(14) See L. G o o d r ic h , E. H a m b r o  and A. Sim o n s , Charter of the United Nations : Commen- 
tary Documents 20-21 (3d rev. ed. 1969).
(15) See e.g., Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 
article 3, 36 Stat. 2277 at 2290, 1 Bevans 631 at 640 (réparations to be paid for violations of 
annexed Régulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land).
(16) Id. Though it might be possible for one to maintain the reference to « international law » 
and « principles » include the law and principles evidenced in past war claim settlements (which 
basically support imposed réparations without regard to the laws of war), binding law and prin­
ciples would only seem to emerge from something other than expedient, self-interested action. 
See C. d e  V is s c h e r , Theory and Reality in Public IntematioTuü Law, 48-50 (P. Corbett trans. 
1957).
(17) See U.N. Carter, supra note 12 at Preamble, point one.
both cases envisaged the defeated powers paying réparations to the victors. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that what emerged from World War II was much 
more lenient than what had been imposed on Germany following the first 
World War.
World War I left 8 million soldiers killed, 22 million civilians killed or 
wounded, and ineffable dévastation throughout the heàrt of Europe (18). 
The so-called « réparation clauses » of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles (19), the 
central âgreement terminating the war(20), provided in articles 231-263 for 
German « war guilt, » réparations for ail loss and damage resulting from the 
aggression of Germany and her allies, and the création of a Réparation 
Commission to determine the exact amount of German liability. The figure 
initially set by the Commission was 132 billion German marks (21), then 
equivalent to about $ 30 billion (22), to be pàid at scheduled intervais. As 
one distinguished commentator has put it, the idea was to « tum [Germany] 
into a nation of exportera organized for the purpose of paying .. .réparation 
claims .... » (23) In the end, the punitive and unrealistic nature of the répa­
ration figure necessitated révision (24) and resulted in only a very small 
portion of the original amount ever being paid (25). It seems, however, Ger­
many regarded its treatment over réparations with indignation, and such 
played a rôle in developments that led to the ascendancy of Nazism and 
the outbreak of World War II (26).
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(18) See C. M e e , Jr., The End of Order xvii (1980) ; and The Réparation Seulement, World 
Peace Foundation, vol. XII, no. 5 at 806 (1929).
(19) See generally Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, reprinted in B. B a r u c h , The Mahing 
of the Réparation and Economie Sections of the Treaty (1970).
(20) The other relevant treaties signed by the allies with the vanquished central powers and 
comprising the WW I peace settlement were the Treaty of Saint Germain (Ausbria), Sept. 10, 
1919 ; the Treaty of Trianon (Hungary), June 4, 1920 ; the Treaty of Neuilly (Bulgaria), Nov. 
27, 1919 ; the Treaty of Sevres (Turkey), Aug. 10, 1920.
(21) See J. A n g e ï x , The Recovery of Germany 19 (1929).
(22) See R. F e r r e l l , American Diplomacy : A History 511 (2d ed. 1975) ($33 billion). On the 
fact that the réparation amounts were seen as not tied to particular violations by Germany of 
the laws of war, see e.g., Opinion of March 25, 1924, U.S.-Germany Mixed Claims Comm'n 75-76, 
excerpted in W. B is h o p , supra note 11 at 799.
(23) See B . B à r u c h , supra note 19 at 45.
(24) The first major révision occurred in 1923 with the Dawes Plan. See Décision No. 2720 
of the Réparation Comm’n, Nov. 30, 1923, reprinted in 14 Allied Powers Réparation Comm'n Offi­
cial Documents : The Experts ’ Plan for Réparation Payments 1 (1927) (on the création of the Com- 
mittee that developed the Plan) and The Réparation Settlement, supra note 18 at 811 (on the 
adoption of the Plan). The second occurred in 1929 with the Young Plan. Seé « Report of the 
Committee of Experts on the Settlement of the Réparation Problem », June 7, 1929, reprinted 
in 24 Am. J. Int’l L. (Official Documents) 81 (1930).
(25) See C. M e e , Jr. supra note 18 at 261 (suggesting that once one subtracts unpaid post-war 
investments in Germany from réparations actually made, the net figure of réparations is « econo- 
mically negligible »).
(26) See A.J.P. T a y l o r , The Origins of the Second World War 50 (1961) (discussing the psy- 
cho-political effects of réparations on the German public). Curiously, Adolph Hitler himself railed 
against réparations in a section of Mein Kampf entitled « The Diktat of Versailles. » See The Ver­
sailles Settlement : Was It Foredoomed To Failure ? 86 (I. Lederer, ed. 1960).
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The Second World War was far more devastating than the First. The 
Nazis themselves exterminated close to 12 million civilians through delibe- 
rate means (27), Russia alone lost more than 6 million men (28), and the 
total amount of war claims against only Germany totaled nearly $300 bil­
lion dollars (29), a figure ten times as large as that fïxed on that defeated 
nation by the Versailles Treaty Réparation Commission (30). Yet the terms 
of settlement with the Axis Powers were clearly more generous than those 
imposed on Germany and her allies in 1919. The 1946 Paris Agreement on 
Réparation (31), which implemented the 1945 Potsdam Déclaration (32), 
basically exacted German réparations from existing external assets and 
unnecessary internai industrial equipment (33). The idea was, in President 
Truman’s words, to have «[Réparations this time ...paid in physical 
assets ...not required for [Germany’s] peacetime subsistence, » (34) and in 
the words of a U.S. State Department représentative, to avoid a réparation 
program like « the World War I conception of réparation as the maximum 
obtainable flnancial compensation in fixed sums of money. » (35) Equally as 
generous were the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy (36), and the 1951 
Treaty of Peace with Japan (37). Both concentrated largely on réparations 
from external assets, military factory and tool equipment not readily sus­
ceptible to conversion to civilian purposes, and général industrial produc­
tion, to the extent not interfering with economic reconstruction or impo- 
sing further pecuniary burdens on the Allies (38).
With the pattern of comparative leniency emerging from the war claims 
settlements of WW II, the plaüsibility of reading points three and six of 
the Charter’s Preamble as continuing to elaborate on and further this deve­
lopment certainly exists. As such, the référencés to « respect for internatio­
nal law » and « acceptance of principles » are capable of being seen as rès- 
tricting the power of the United Nations by requiring that ail of its actions 
be consistent with established juridical norms. In the context of war claims,
(27) See H. M o r g e n th a t j , Politics Among Nations : The Strugglefor Power and Peace 364 (5th 
ed. 1973).
(28) See J. L u k a o s , A New History of the Cold War 4 (3d ed. 1966).
(29) See H oward , «The Paris Agreement on Réparation from Germany», 14 Dept. of State 
Bull. 1023 (1946).
(30) See text accompanying supra note 22.
(31) See Final Act and Annex of the Paris Conference on Réparations, Jan. 14, 1946, reprin­
ted in 40 Am. J. Int’l L. (Official Documents) 117 (1946).
(32) See Report of Tripartite Conference of Berlin, Reprinted in 39 Am. J. Int ’l L. (Official 
Documents) 245 (1945).
(33) See de  Vries , « The International Responsibility of the United States for Vested German 
Assets », 51 Am. J. Int’l L. 18, 20 (1957).
(34) See 13 Dept. of State Bull. 208, 210 (1945).
(35) H oward , supra note 29.
(36) Treaty of Peace, Feb. 10, 1947, reprinted in 42 Am. J. Int’l L. (Official Documents) 47 
(1948).
(37) Treaty of Peace, Sept. 8, 1951, reprinted in 46 Am. J. Int’l L. 71 (1952).
(38) See e.g., Treaty of Peace with Italy, supra note 36 at Part VI, sec. I ; Treaty of Peace 
with Japan, supra note 37 at Chpt. Y.
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this would mandate settlement for violations of the laws o f war ; not for 
ail loss, damage, or injury simply proceeding from an unlawful invasion 
and occupation.
A major objection to this line of reasoning exists in the fact that the 
UN Charter was drafted contemporaneously with the réparation settle­
ments of the Second World War. It might be questioned how the 
Preamble to the Charter could bé reâd as confîning UN imposed répara­
tions to claims involving compensation for violations of the rules of war 
when the nations that drew up the Charter’s terms were at roughly that 
same time busy putting together treaties of peace calling for claims settle­
ment without regard to transgressions of the laws and customs governing 
the prosecution of combat. Surely, if the language of points three and six 
of the Preamble have any meaning, it is the exact opposite of the restric­
tive one suggested above. The contemporeneity of the Charter and the set­
tlements of WW II suggest the United Nations is not obligated to fashion 
a system of réparations based only on conduct inconsistent with the laws 
of armed warfare.
There would seem two problems with concluding that the drafting, 
during the same time frame, of the peace treaties of the Second World 
War and the Charter of the UN means the Preamble to the latter can be 
interpreted as authorizing United Nations réparation schemes that ignore 
the way war was prosecuted and focus only on whether its initiation was 
capable of being characterized as unlawful aggression. The first has to do 
with the fact the peace settlements of World War II were backward-loo- 
king, designed to address international violence which had already occur­
red and continued to evoke powerful émotions. The Charter, on the other 
hand, was intended to be forward-looking, directed at securing future 
world order through the articulation in peace time of principled coopéra­
tive efforts. The second problem is that the WW II peace treaties reflected 
the standards the individual Allies felt they were limited by after the 
incredible losses they had been forced to endure. But the Charter was 
aimed at limiting the power of a new international organ, an entity which 
might act in ways completely unanticipated by its prime architects. Given 
the appréhension associated with the création of an organization able to 
act for the entire community of nations, and the forward rather than 
backward-looking character of its organic document, there certainly 
appears ample reason to believe the roughly contemporaneous nature of 
the Charter and the WW II settlements do not inexorably preclude inter- 
preting the Charter’s Preamble as restricting UN réparation schemes to 
claims arising out of particular acts violative of the laws of warfare. Thus, 
it may well be appropriate to find points three and six of the Preamble 
as establishing limitations on the Security Council’s power to fashion the 
standards for Gulf War claims.
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III.
Aside from the terms of the Preamble, articles 1 and 2 of the Charter, 
stating the purposes and principles of the UN, contain language of rele- 
vance to the question of the Security Council’s power to establish a com­
pensation plan imposing liability for claims arising from international 
conflict. Those articles enter the équation by virtue of article 24, para- 
graph 2’s reference to the UN’s « Purposes and Principles. » (39) It will be 
recalled that article 24 is part of that chapter in the Charter setting forth 
the Security Councü’s fonctions and powers. The opening paragraph' of the 
article indicates that the primary responsibility of the Council is the main­
tenance of peace and security (40). It provides further that the Council « in 
carrying out its duties under this responsibility » acts on behalf of the mem- 
bers of the UN (41). Then 24(2) follows by providing that in discharging 
these duties the Council « shall act in accordance with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations. » (42)
Since it is incontrovertible that the Security Council in carrying out its 
duties is thus required to act in accordance with the purposes and prin­
ciples of articles 1 and 2, what exists in the terms of those provisions to 
suggest a limitation on the Council’s power in fashioning a war compensa­
tion plan ? Initially there is the language of article 1, paragraph 1, referen- 
cing the fact that a major purpose of the UN is the maintenance of peace 
and security, and that purpose is to be secured by bringing about through 
peaceful means the settlement of international disputes or situations «in 
conformity with the principles of justice and international law. » (43) Then 
there is article 2, paragraph 3’s reference to the fact that in pursuing this, 
and other, purposes the UN is to act in accordance with the principle of 
settling disputes so that «peace, security, and justice, are not endange- 
red. » (44) Again, as with the Preamble, the terms international law, prin­
ciples, and justice appear, this time in connection with 24(2)’s spécifié limi­
tation on the Security Council’s power of action.
The significance and import of these references in terms of a check on the 
Security Council is implied by several things. First, no similar sort of res- 
traint seems to have been imposed on the Security Council’s predecessor, 
the Council of The League of Nations. Articles 11, 15, and 17 of the League 
Covenant provided that war or threat of war was a concern of the League, 
disputes likely to lead to a rupture between League members fell within the 
jurisdiction of the Council, and disputes involving non-members could be
(39) U.N. Charter, supra note 12, art. 24(2).
(40) Id. at art. 24(1).
(41) Id.
(42) Id. at art. 24(2).
(43) Id. at art 1(1).
(44) Id. at art. 2(3).
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brought within the Council’s jurisdiction by non-member acceptance of the 
obligations of the Covenant (45). In each of these cases, the Council was 
empowered to act. As the governing language of the provisions spoke only 
of actions the Council deemed appropriate, it would appear its powers were 
in theory quite vast (46). The use of the term « just » in paragraph 4 of 
article 15 does not départ from this undérstanding since, unlike with the 
Charter’s use of similar terms, it is clear the Covenant did not view justice 
as an external limit on the power of the Council, but as a factor that was
(45) See The Covenant of the League of Nations, as amended (1924), League o f Nations Doc. 
No. C.L. 102.1926.V., arts. 11, 15, 17. Article 11 provided in relevant part :
1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League 
or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take 
any action that may be deemed wise and effectuai to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any 
such emergency should arise, the Secretary-General shall, on the request of any Member of the 
League, forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.
Article 15 stated in part :
1. I f  there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rup­
ture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial seulement in accordance with Article 13, 
the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party 
to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the 
Secretary General, who will make ail necessary arrangements for a full investigation and considé­
ration thereof.
3. The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are 
successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dis­
pute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may seem appropriate.
4. I f  the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote 
shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recom­
mendations which are deemed jùst and proper in regard thereto.
Article 17 noted :
1. In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a mem­
ber of the League or between States not members of the League, the State or States not members 
of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the pur­
poses of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is 
accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications 
as may be deemed necessary by the Council.
2. Upon such invitation being given, the Council shall immediately institute an enquiry into 
the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effec­
tuai in the circumstances.
3. I f  a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League 
for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the 
provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.
4. I f  both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of members­
hip in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and 
make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will resuit in the settlement of the 
dispute.
(46) Id. Article 11(1) speaks of «any action that may be deemed wise and effectuai»; 
article 15(3) of « terms of settlement ...the Council may deem appropriate » and 15(4) of « recom­
mendations ...deemed just and proper»; article 17(2) of «action as may seem best and most 
effectuai » and 17(4) of « recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will resuit in the settle­
ment of the dispute. »
to be reflected in recommendations emerging from the Council’s exercise of 
power under article 15 (47). ,
The second item indicating that the UN Charter’s references in arti­
cles 1 and 2 to international law, principles, and justice are significant in 
suggesting a check or limit on the power of the Security Council cornes 
from the Charter’s early draft, the Dumbarton Oaks proposai (48). 
Nowhere in chapter I, paragraph I, the predecessor of Charter article 1(1), 
nor chapter II, paragraph 3, the predecessor of article 2(3), do any of these 
terms appear (49). In addressing the discharge by the Security Council of 
its responsibilities, chapter VI, section B, paragraph 2 (50), the predecessor 
of article 24(2), alludes to the Council being restricted by the purposes and 
principles of the organization. But as those purposes and principles make 
no reference of the sort incorporated in articles 1(1) and 2(3) of the Charter, 
what seems to have been envisioned, at least in this respect, is an interna­
tional body more akin to the League than to today’s United Nations.
The third and final thing suggesting that articles 1 and 2 rèally are signi­
ficant as a check on how the Security Council exercises its powers, concems 
the history behind the inclusion in paragraphs 1 and 3 of these respective 
provisions of the Charter to the references to international law, principles, 
and justice. On several occasions during the 1945 San Francisco Conference 
on International Organization, proposais to include in article 1, para-
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(47) There seems a qualitative différence between saying, as article 15(4) of the Covenant 
does, that the League Council is to recommend dispute settlements «which are deemed just ... », 
and saying, as articles 1(1) and 24(2) of the Charter do, that the Security Council is to act in 
accordance with the purpose of maintaining peace and security, and to that end is to bring about 
peaceful settlements « in conformity with the principles of justice and international law. » While 
both indicate the settlement is to reflect justice (and international law), the Charter appears to 
go further and establish justice (and international law) as a reflected condition, external to the 
Security Council, which actually serves to set the bounds of its authority. After ail, the Covenant 
leaves it up to the Council to determine if its settlement is just. The Charter sets a much more 
objective tone.
(48) See Proposais for the Establishment of a General International Organization (Dumbar­
ton Oaks Proposai), Oct. 7, 1944, reprinted in 39 Am. J. Int’l L. (Official Documents) 42, 46 
(1945).
(49) Id., at Chpt. I, para. 1, and Chpt. II, para. 3, reading, respectively :
The purposes of the Organization should be :
1. To maintain international peace and security ; and to that end to take effective collective 
measures for the prévention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace ;
In pursuit of the purposes mentioned in Chapter I the Organization and its members should 
act in accordance with the following principles :
3. Ail members of the Organization shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security are not endangered.
(50) Id. at Chpt. VI, sec. B, para. 2.
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graph 1, reference to justice and international law were rejected (51). The 
rejected proposais ail focused on inserting these terms in the opening phra- 
seology of 1(1). This would have altered the basic purpose of the UN by 
predicating the maintenance of peace and security on the concepts of jus­
tice and international law. As that phraseology stands, the maintenance of 
peace and security is of suffïciently grave importance to remain free of any 
encumbering condition. Had it been any other way, there is the possibility 
the Charter may have admitted of interprétations increasing the freedom 
of states to employ force to resolve acute différences of policy (52). In the 
end, justice and international law were incorporated in the language of 
article 1(1) to guard against accommodations sacrificing the rights of small 
states in the interest of peace (53). The exact spot where the terms were 
ultimately placed, however, relegated them to the status of a limitation on 
the power of the organs of the UN, most importantly the Security Council, 
to ad just or settle perilous disputes or situations of concern to the interna­
tional community. The overarching preeminence of maintaining peace and 
security was left unaffected.
The story behind the inclusion of the term « justice » in article 2, para­
graph 3, is closely tied to that of article 1(1). The former provision is the 
statement of the Charter’s Principle on dispute settlement, and thus pro­
vides an articulated standard for evaluating actions taken to peacefully 
resolve international disputes. It is therefore understandable 2(3)’s develop­
ment is connected with that of the Purpose provision it serves to flesh-out. 
From ail indications, « justice » found its way into the terminology of 
article 2, paragraph 3, as a deliberate attempt to limit the power of the 
UN’s organs. Though as with article 1(1), the generative concem for the 
check stemmed from a desire to foreclose the possibility of the international 
organization engaging in Munich-like appeasement at the expense of small 
states (54). There seems ample reason to accept the notion that 2(3) and 
1(1) are to be understood as limitations on the Security Council’s power 
nonetheless. Irrespective of the appréhensions precipitating efforts by draf­
ters of an organic document to restrict the authorities conferred upon enti- 
ties of power created, the restrictions fashioned remain restrictions capable 
of affecting ail cases.
(51) See Doc. 742,1/1/23, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 318 (1945) ; Doc. 885,1/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 
393-95 (1945) ; Doc. 926, 1/1/36, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 422-23 (1945) ; Doc. 944, I/l/34/(l), 6 
U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 453 (1945) ; Doc. 1179, 1/9(1), 6 U.N.C.I.O. 245-46 (1945) ; Doc. 1187, 1/13, 6 
U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 203 (1945).
(52) See e.g., Z ed au s , «Protection of Nationals Abroad : Is Consent the Basis of Légal Obli­
gation ? d, 25 Texas Int’l L.J. 209, 233 (1990).
(53) See L. G o o d r ic h , E. H à m b r o , and A. Sim o n s , swpra note 14 at 28.
(54) Id. at 41.
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IV.
As alluded to above, article 24(1) provides the Security Council has the 
« primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. » (55) As just discussed, in carrying out its responsibility the Secu­
rity Council’s duties must be discharged in accordance with Charter arti­
cles 1 and 2, which limit the powers, possessed by the Council. The second 
sentence of article 24(2), in referencing the specific chapters of the Charter 
laying down the particular powers the Council has to discharge its duties 
with regard to peace and security (56), implicates another source for ques- 
tioning the propriety of establishing war claim resolution plans that do not 
contain settlement based on violations of the rules of armed combat. The 
reason this seems so is because nothing in the language of the individual 
provisions of the relevant chapters referenced contain anything explicitly 
indicating the Security Council operates without restriction.
The chapters most directly involved are VI and VII. Chapter VI essen- 
tially deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes. Pursuant to the sys- 
tem it creates, disputes likely to endanger international peace and secu­
rity (57), or situations which might lead to international friction or give rise 
to a dispute (58), trigger Security Council investigativé authority (59), and, 
in the appropriate case, authority to call for settlement (60) or entertain 
submissions from members or non-members of the United Nations (61). 
Article 36 déclarés that disputes or situations likely to endanger internatio­
nal security authorize the Council to recommend settlement procedures or 
methods of adjustment (62). Article 37 follows this by authorizing the 
Council to recommend terms of settlement in a case where it has decided 
a dispute referred to it by parties unable to develop their own resolution 
is one that is in fact likely to endanger international peace and secu­
rity (63). Chapter VII focuses on more exigent situations involving actual 
or imminent ruptures of international peace. It empowers the Security 
Council to make déterminations with regard to the existence of threats to
(55) See U.N. Charter, supra note 12, art. 24(1).
(56) Id., art. 24(2). The second sentence states : « The specific powers granted to the Security 
Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. »
(57) See id., art. 33(1).
(58) See id., art. 34.
(59) Id.
(60) See id., art. 33(2).
(61) See id., art. 35.
(62) See id., art. 36, providing in paragraph 1er :
The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 
[(likely to endanger international peace and security)] or of a situation of like nature recommend 
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
(63) See id., art. 37(2) stating :
I f  the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall décidé whether to take action under 
Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.
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the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, and adopt recom­
mendations or make décisions concerning measures to be taken to restore 
peace and security (64). Such measures may consist of the use of armed 
force (65) or devices short of such (66). Article 40 authorizes the Council to 
prevent the aggravation of relevant situations by calling upon the parties 
involved to comply with provisional measures pending the adoption of 
Council recommendations or décisions (67).
The authority of the Security Council to make recommendations under 
article 36 is not unlimited. By its very terms, it concerns only « procedures 
or methods of adjustment. » (68) Thus, it would appear difficult to argue 
that the reference to « appropriate » procedures or methods of adjustment 
suggests an expansion of the Council’s substantive powers vesting it with 
authority to act outside the purposes and principles of the Charter invoked 
by the opening sentence of article 24, paragraph 2. Article 37 of chapter VI 
also references recommendations that are « appropriate. » (69) However, it 
deals not with procédural matters, but the actual « terms of settlement » of 
disputes addressed by the Security Council (70). This presents the possibi­
lity of a construction expanding the Council’s substantive powers so as to 
permit things like réparation schemes not dépendent on the laws of war. 
Indeed, the term « appropriate », itself is not used alone in 37, as in 
article 36, but in the phrase « as it [the Council] may consider appro­
priate, > (71) further suggesting great breadth. The same kind of termino- 
logy appears in article 40, chapter VII, referencing provisional measures « it 
[the Council] deems necessary or desirable. » (72) What makes it difficult to 
accept that the language of either article 37 or article 40 empowers the 
Council to act in a way envisioning the adoption of a war claims settlement 
plan which sets controlling rules for prosecuting war to one side is the very 
fact that article 24(2) unequivocally déclarés that the Council, in dischar- 
ging its duties under chapters VI and VII, shall act in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the UN. Unless we ascribe more signifïcance to 
open-ended references to « appropriate » and « necessary or desirable » than 
we do to unequivocal déclarations, like that in 24(2), it would seem hard
(64) See id., art. 39.
(65) See id., art. 42.
(66) See id., art. 41.
(67) See id., art. 40 déclarés in part :
In order to prevent the aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making 
the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the par­
ties concemed to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable.
(68) See supra note 62.
(69) See supra note 63.
(70) On the substantive nature of « terms of settlements » see, L. G o o d r ic h , E. H a m b r o , and 
A. S im o n s , supra note 14 at 284.
(71) See id.
(72) See supra note 67.
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to accept that the Council is not restricted by the international law of 
armed warfare when devising a settlement plan.
Adding to the concern generated by the provision just looked at is the 
fact that the Dumbarton Oaks proposai differed in regard to Charter chap­
ters VI and VII in a couple of important respects. As observed above, 
article 36 empowered the Council to recommend procédural stratégies for 
resolving disputes, and 37 substantive settlements in the event the parties 
were unable to successfully put such together. Article 40 dealt with provi­
sional measures involving threats to or breaches of the peace. Chapter 
VIII, section A, of the Dumbarton Oaks proposai contained a provision 
replicating Charter article 36, but no parallel to article 37. Paragraph 5 of 
section A authorized Council recommendations of « appropriate procedures 
or methods of adjustment. » (73) Paragraph 4, however, predecessor to 
article 37, simply provided that if the Security Council determined a dis­
pute referred to it by the parties thereto was in fact likely to endanger 
peace and security, then it was to décidé whether to take action under 
paragraph 5. The Council was given no power to make recommendations on 
substantive terms of settlement (74). Similarly, section B of chapter VIII 
contained no grant of power to the Security Council to call upon parties to 
a threat to or breach of the peace to follow certain provisional measures 
directed at preventing aggravation of the extant situation. Basically, the 
proposais contained in section B focused on Council déterminations, recom­
mendations, and décisions regarding threats to the peace, breaches of the 
peace, or acts of aggression (75), and military and nonmilitary measures 
necessary to maintain or restore peace and security (76).
The absence from the Dumbarton Oaks proposai of Security Council 
authorization in regard to substantive terms of settlement and provisional 
measures certainly supports the idea that the inclusion of such in the UN 
Charter must be accorded significance. Two things, however, prove distur-
(73) See Dumbarton Oaks proposai, supra note 48 at 51, Chpt. VIII, sec. A, para. 5.
(74) See id., Chpt. VIII, sec. A, para. 4. To a large extent this may have reflected U .S . oppo­
sition to having the Council serve as the « judge», rather than a «policeman», of international 
peace and security. See L. G o o d r ic h , E. H a m b r o , and A. Sem on s, supra note 14 at 284.
(75) See id., Chpt. VIII, sec. B, para. 2 reading :
2. In général the Security Council should determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of aggression and should make recommendations or décidé upon the 
measures to be taken to maintain or restore peace and security.
(76) See id., at paras. 3 and 4 providing, respectively :
3. The Security Council should be empowered to determine what diplomatie, economic, or 
other measures not involving the use of armed force should be employed to give effect to its déci­
sions, and to call upon members of the Organization to apply such measures. Such measures may 
include complete or partial interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, télégraphie, radio and other 
means of communication and the severance of diplomatie and economic relations.
4. Should the Security Council consider such measures to be inadequate, it should be empowe­
red to take such action by air, naval or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. Such action may include démonstrations, blockade and other 
opérations by air, sea or land forces of members of the Organization.
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bing about conceiving of this significance as an expansion of power which 
allows the Council to adopt réparation systems ignoring the laws of armed 
combat.
First, the inclusions contained in articles 37 and 40 on substantive terms 
of settlement and provisional measures may be seen as directed simply at 
giving the Council power in areas not addressed by the Dumbarton Oaks 
proposai. They need not be viewed as suggestive of the manner in which 
power possessed by the Council may be exercised. Evidence corroborating 
this understanding can be gleaned especially from the records of the 1945 
San Francisco Conference that relate to the adoption of article 40. As best 
as can be determined, that provision found its way into the Charter as part 
of the arrangement that led to the refusai to adopt paragraph 1, section B, 
chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks proposai. That paragraph would have 
allowed the Security Council to deem the failure of parties to settle a dis­
pute likely to endanger international peace and security as a threat to the 
peace, thereby activating Council powers to take diplomatie, economic, or 
military measures (77). The delegates objected to Charter incorporation of 
any such provision, while endorsing the inclusion of article 40’s power of 
provisional measures (78). The idea could appear as one aimed predominan- 
tly at emphasizing the limits on the Council, yet accepting the reality that 
action anticipating Council recommendations or décisions may be necessary 
to prevent aggravation of tense international situations. This would suggest 
the areas of power given the Council have been increased, but the Charter 
restrictions on the exercise of that power remain intact.
Secondly, paragraph 1 of section B, chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks 
proposai also provided in its final clause that measures taken thereunder 
by the Security Council were to be « in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the Organization. » (79) Despite the fact paragraph 1 was 
never incorporated in the Charter, the Council would still seem subject to 
limitations when acting under the authorities it possesses, since the fonda­
mental reason for the paragraph’s rejection related to concern about the 
Council deciding the failure of dispute settlement meant a threat to the 
peace existed (80). Furthermore, both paragraph 3, section B, chapter VI of 
the Dumbarton Oaks proposai (81) and article 24(2) of the Charter subject
(77) See para. 1, sec. B, Chapter VIII, stating :
Should the Security Council deem that a failure to settle a dispute in accordance with proce­
dures indicated in paragraph 3 or Section A, or in accordance with its recommendations made 
under paragraph 5 of Section A, constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace 
and security, it should take any measures necessary for the maintenance of international peace 
and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization.
(78) See « Report of Rapporteur of Commission III, Committee III, on Chapter VIII, Section 
B », Doc. 881, III/3/46 at 4-7, 12 U.N.C.I.O. 505-508 (1945).
(79) See supra note 77.
(80) See L. G o o d r ic h  and A. S im o n s , The United Nations and the Maintenance of Internatio­
nal Peace and Security 368 (1955).
(81) See Dumbarton Oaks proposai, supra note 48, at paragraph 1, sec. B, Chpt. VI.
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the powers enumerated for peacefully settling disputes, and dealing with 
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, to the 
purposes and principles of the organization. Therefore, some of the opposi­
tion at the San Francisco Conference to the final clause of paragraph 1 may 
have been founded on little more than the fact that it was a redundant réi­
tération (82). If that is so, it hardly supports the argument that the elabo- 
rations on the Council’s powers under chapters VI and VII suggest the abi- 
lity to act beyond the limits of Charter articles 1 and 2.
V.
Though the UN Charter appears to present some problems with conclu- 
ding the Security Council has incontestable power to establish a war claims 
settlement plan ignoring the laws of military engagement, what about 
conceiving of the Resolutions establishing the plan as treaties between the 
relevant parties ? As noted earlier, the accepted post-war practice of states 
has involved réparation agreements that impose on the defeated nation(s) 
an obligation to pay claims without regard to violations of the laws of war. 
Thus, if the Résolutions concerning Iraq are seen as treaties, the fact they 
fix liability for loss, damage, or injury simply because of the unlawful inva­
sion and occupation is irrelevant. In any case, the recovery standard arti- 
culated by the Security Council for application by the Compensation Com­
mission is perfectly consonant with governing norms.
Surely it is accurate to state that there is less than total agreement 
among scholars and governments on the matter of the treaty-making capa- 
city of international organizations. Thus, even leaving aside the issue of 
whether Resolutions 674 and 687 are framed in a way satisfying expecta­
tions about the form of an actual international agreement, there are some 
who would insist that no international organization is capable of making 
a binding treaty commitment with another (83), and others who would 
conclude the exact opposite (84). Assuming the more libéral approach is 
understood as the accurate position, it is one thing to argue that internatio­
nal organizations have treaty-making capacity, and something entirely dif­
ferent to argue the organization with which one is concerned has entered 
into a treaty within the ambit of its compétence. In the context of the Uni­
ted Nations Resolutions of concern here, this distinction between treaty- 
making capacity and compétence is essential. The same distinction exists 
with regard to individual states as well. Though it is beyond doubt that
(82) See « Report o f Rapporteur », swpra note 78, Doc. 881, III/3/46 at 4, 12 U.N.C.I.O. 505 
(1945).
(83) See I. B r o w n l ie , Principles of Public International Law 660-61 (1973).
(84) ] See F itzmaurice, « The L aw  and Procedure of the International Court of Jus­
tice », [1953] Brit. Yb. Int’l L. 2.
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states possess the capacity to enter into treaties (85), questions may arise 
concerning whether they are competent to draw on that capacity in parti- 
cular instances (86).
The matter of competency, as it relates to individual states, has in large 
measure been held to deal with situations in which it is « manifest » that 
constitutional limits do not authorize the conclusion of particular treaty 
commitment (87). As that same principle is applied to the United 
Nations (88), it would necessitate examination of the provisions of the 
Charter to ascertain the limits on the powers of the various organs which 
might purport to act for it. As already discussed, there is much room for 
suspecting the Security Council lacks the power to adopt Resolutions set­
ting forth the type of réparation standard it has applied to Iraq in the 
wake of the Gulf War. Whether the level of suspicion is substantial enough 
to admit of the view it is « manifest » the Council has acted ultra vires is 
an intriguing question. The typical notion is that it is the violation of a 
constitutional or organic document that must be « manifest. » Yet it would 
seem that such violations can be manifest not only when it is obviously 
plain and clear no authority exists for the treaty entered into, but also 
when it is just as plain and clear that serious réservations present them- 
selves regarding the existence of needed authority (89). Were the former 
alone to be considered as satisfying the test that a violation be « manifest, » 
the only occasion on which the rule might apply would involve the extre- 
mely improbable case of a constitutional document explicitly reciting that 
some specific treaty-making power is denied the body acting to exercise 
such. Cases plainly raising genuine concéms about the possession of such a 
power would be treated as those involving unequivocal constitutional lan­
guage granting authority to make the treaty actually made. Silence alone 
should not be taken as meaning that a « manifest » violation of a constitu­
tional limitation is present. But there are certainly some situations when 
it is so plain and clear serious questions exist with regard to the power to 
make a particular treaty, that it would be inappropriate to conceive of the
(85) See e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatiea, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONP. 39/27 
(1969).
(86) See arts. 46 and 8.
(87) See id., art. 46. For cases of the Permanent Court o f International, Justice concluding the 
limits were not « manifest », see Légal Status of Eastern Greenland, P.C.I.J. ser. A/B, No. 53 at 
71 (1933), and Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District o f Gex, P.G.I.J. ser. A/B, No. 46 
(1932).
(88) On this principle being applied to international organizations, see UN Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between Internatio­
nal Organizations, art. 46 (2)-(3), reprinted in 25 Int’l Leg. Mai. 543, 570 (1986).
(89) Thus, in commenting on the situation of the President’s power under the U.S. Constitu­
tion to enter into international agreements, comment c, §311, Restatement (Revised) of the Law 
of Foreign Relations of the United States (1986), indicates that, despite the général uncertainty 
surrounding the extent of the power, « some agreements ... are of sufficiënt formality, dignity and 
importance that in the unlikely event of the President’s attempting to make such an agreement 
on his own authority his lack of authority might be regarded as ‘mànifest’ ».
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absence of language of express déniai as tantamount to that of express 
grant.
As to the matter of Iraq raising the claim of the Security Council excee- 
ding its powers, problems certainly exist. International law would support 
such a claim raised by the United Nations itself (90). The rationale being 
that the absence of compétence to enter into the commitment vitiates the 
consent given thereto. Governing légal principles, however, say nothing 
about the claim of ultra vires being raised by states situated like Iraq — 
states signing on to an international agreement with another entity which 
has exceeded its powers in entering the commitment (91). One might sug- 
gest the rationale for depriving these states of the opportunity to raise the 
claim dérivés from the unclean hands had in entering a commitment with 
another entity « manifestly » lacking the power to enter such, then later 
attempting to escape from the commitment’s obligations when it appears 
agreement had been ill-considered and too hastily undertaken. It seems 
that equally convincing reasons exist, however, for reaching the exact 
opposite conclusion. Specifically, since no one is likely to understand the 
ambiguities of a particular constitutional document better than the entity 
operating under it, commitments taken on by that entity should not later 
be subject to avoidance by it when the unwise or burdensome nature of the 
commitments becomes apparent. To allow such promotes extravagant 
claims to treaty-making power, because states assiduously acting within 
their power cannot raise objections to the validity of commitments made 
by others who do not follow such a disciplined approach, and those who 
claim power they do not possess can décidé to observe commitments that 
tum out to be bénéficiai and escape those that prove onerous. Further- 
more, in order to encourage the negotiation and making of treaties that are 
within the constitutional power of the parties involved, the party that is 
not suspected of exceeding its authority should have the opportunity to 
contest, if needed, the validity of a treaty on the grounds that the other 
party committed has exceeded its own constitutional power. By recognizing 
the existence of such an opportunity, international law discourages parties 
inclined to push the limits of their power from shopping for agreements 
that prove advantageous and abandoning those that do not.
Without attempting to prejudge the situation conceming Iraq, what has 
been said suggests the possibility it could appropriately question the argu­
ment that the Security Council Résolutions addressing Gulf War compensa­
tion can be viewed as tantamount to treaty commitments. Though it grud- 
gingly accepted the Resolutions (92), problems exist with regard to whether
(90) See Vienna Convention, supra note 88, art. 46(2).
(91) Id.
(92) See « War in Persian Gulf Ends ; Iraq Accepta U.N. Cease-Fire Demand for Réparations, 
But Calls Council ‘Unjust’ », U.N. Chronicle, June 1991, at 6 (Resolution 687).
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the Council exceeded its power in a « manifest » way, and whether Iraq, as 
well as the United Nations, is capable of raising such a challenge. These are 
difficult and complex matters. What is straightforward and crystal clear, 
however, is that one should be incredibly reluctant to simply accept bald 
statements about Iraq’s Gulf War liability being determined by nothing 
more than the fact its invasion and occupation of Kuwait were illégal.
